// verified.nodes
The three Vortex market .onion addresses
All three mirrors share one backend. Your account, wallet balance, active orders, and vendor messages appear identically across all three endpoints. Use whichever loads fastest in your session.
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NODE-01 Online · verified 2026-04-23 PRIMARY
Loading verified address…Primary reference node. PGP signature on this address was verified against the Dread /d/vortex canonical key on 2026-04-22. Copy, don't type.
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NODE-02 Online · verified 2026-04-23 FAILOVER
Loading verified address…Primary failover. Typically lower traffic than NODE-01 — faster during peak hours. Same authentication chain. Same platform.
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NODE-03 Online · verified 2026-04-23 FAILOVER
Loading verified address…Secondary failover. Slightly slower on average. Use if NODE-01 and NODE-02 are queuing. State is identical — your session data transfers instantly.
// node.telemetry
Mirror status and availability comparison
Uptime figures are measured over the trailing 30 days across 4-hour check intervals. Response time reflects median load inside the Tor network — variance is high and depends on circuit quality.
| Node | Role | Uptime (30d) | Median response | Last verified | Status | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NODE-01 | Primary | 99.1% | 2.3s | 2026-04-23 | Online | |
| NODE-02 | Failover | 97.3% | 3.1s | 2026-04-23 | Online | |
| NODE-03 | Failover | 96.8% | 3.8s | 2026-04-22 | Online |
Response times measured via authenticated Tor circuits. Variance across circuits is ±40%. If your measured response is 2–3× the median listed here, rotate your Tor circuit via New Identity and retry. The platform queue system handles overload — a slow response is not an indicator of a compromise or outage. For real-time status, check the PGP-signed canary in the platform footer after connecting.
// pgp.verification
How to verify a Vortex mirror address independently
You don't have to trust this page. Every address here can be verified against Vortex's canonical PGP key published at launch. Here's the process that takes about four minutes.
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01
Find the signed announcement on Dread
Navigate to
/d/vortexon Dread (accessible via Tor). Look for an official pinned post from the Vortex admin account with a PGP-signed block containing the .onion addresses. This is the authoritative source. Any unsigned post claiming to show Vortex addresses is not verifiable. -
02
Import the canonical Vortex PGP key
The Vortex public key fingerprint is published in the first signed post. Import it with GnuPG:
gpg --recv-keys [FINGERPRINT]or paste the ASCII-armored key directly:gpg --import vortex.asc. Verify the fingerprint matches what's shown in the Dread post before proceeding. Do not trust a key that arrives from any other source. -
03
Verify the PGP signature on the announcement
Copy the entire signed block (from
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----to-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----) into a text file. Run:gpg --verify announcement.txt. A good signature will showGood signature from "Vortex Market"alongside the key fingerprint. If the signature is invalid or the fingerprint does not match — stop. Do not use the addresses from that announcement. -
04
Compare addresses character by character
Extract the three .onion addresses from the verified announcement. Compare each one to the addresses on this page. v3 .onion addresses are 56 characters. Look specifically at the first 8 and last 8 — those are the characters most commonly swapped in typo-squatting attacks. A single different character routes you to a completely different server.
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05
Cache the fingerprint locally for future sessions
Save the verified fingerprint in a local encrypted file using VeraCrypt or similar. On future sessions, your verification takes 15 seconds: compare the cached fingerprint to what the platform displays in its footer. The four-minute process above only happens once — or after a market announces a key rotation, which Vortex has not done since 2023.
// pgp.verify — anti-phishing layer active
// char-check.routine
After pasting, verify the first 6 and last 6 characters before pressing Enter. Example check for NODE-01:
Highlighted characters are your 12-point fingerprint. If even one differs, close the tab.
// mirror.topology — 3 v3 endpoints, shared state
For a deeper explanation of how v3 .onion addresses work and why they are cryptographically resistant to spoofing, the Tor Project's onion services documentation covers the ed25519 key generation process. The EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense guide covers PGP key verification for users who are new to the process. Both resources are freely available over Tor.
// faq.mirrors
Nine questions about Vortex mirrors and verification
These are the questions that come up when people can't connect, find an unexpected address, or want to understand how the mirror system works. For general market questions, see the access guide.
A Vortex mirror is an independent Tor hidden service endpoint that runs an authenticated connection to Vortex's shared backend. Three mirrors exist for two reasons: redundancy against DDoS attacks targeting individual endpoints, and load distribution during peak traffic windows. When one node is under pressure, the queue on the other two stays shorter.
All three share state in real time. Your registered account, active orders, cart contents, wallet balance, and vendor message history are identical across all three addresses. Switching mirrors mid-session is seamless — there is no re-authentication, no data loss, and no need to log back in. The only thing that changes is which entry point you hit first.
The three-mirror structure has been Vortex's published configuration since the market launched in October 2023. It has not expanded to four or five endpoints. If a page claims to show you additional Vortex mirrors, those are either fabricated addresses that point to phishing servers, or stale data from a directory that has not been updated. Both are dangerous. Three is the canonical number.
The verification process above covers this in detail, but the short version is: find Vortex's PGP-signed announcement on Dread (/d/vortex), verify the signature with GnuPG against the canonical fingerprint, and extract the addresses from the verified document. Compare those against what this page shows. If they match, the addresses are authenticated.
The visual design of Vortex — the deep purple and cyan cyberpunk interface — is entirely copyable with HTML and CSS. Phishing sites replicate it routinely. The purple background and Space Grotesk font are not authentication. The 56-character ed25519 address is. Once you have verified it once and cached the fingerprint locally, future checks take about 15 seconds: open the platform footer, compare the fingerprint displayed there to your cached value.
Never get Vortex links from Telegram groups, Reddit threads, or Discord servers without PGP verification. Those sources have no accountability, and phishing links posted there are often the first thing that appears in search results targeting new users.
Version 3 .onion addresses use ed25519 elliptic curve cryptography and are 56 characters long (the older v2 format was 16 characters). The critical property: the address itself is derived directly from the server's public key. This means the address is not just a label — it is a cryptographic commitment to the server's identity. Any server that responds to a v3 .onion address must hold the corresponding private key.
For users, this matters because it makes address spoofing computationally infeasible with current technology. A phishing operator cannot generate an ed25519 key whose public key hashes to the same address as Vortex's real address. They have to use a different address — which means even one character difference exposes the fraud. The Tor Project deprecated v2 addresses in 2021 specifically because v2 had weaker cryptographic guarantees. All three Vortex mirrors use v3 addressing.
The practical implication: typing a v3 address manually is extremely risky. At 56 characters, a single transposition lands you on a completely different server. The character set (lowercase letters plus digits 2–7) also creates confusable pairs: i and l, 0 and o at a glance in some fonts. Copy buttons exist precisely because no human reliably types 56 characters with zero errors.
Start with NODE-01 (primary). It carries the highest traffic because it is the most frequently cited reference address, which means it also has the most comprehensive uptime monitoring. If NODE-01 is queuing longer than 45 seconds, try NODE-02. If NODE-02 is also slow, try NODE-03. The queue times vary independently because each endpoint has a different distribution of incoming Tor circuits.
There is no login advantage to using one mirror over another. Your session state is replicated across all three backends. If you start a purchase flow on NODE-01 and switch to NODE-02, the cart is there. If you receive a vendor message on NODE-03 and later open NODE-01, the message is there. The mirrors are not separate platforms — they are separate doors into the same room.
One practical tip: the address you paste into Tor Browser does not have to match the address you used last session. Each session, copy a fresh address from this page, paste it, and verify. Starting fresh each session with a new clipboard paste is a habit that prevents the clipboard-hijacking malware category of attack — where an extension or process swaps your copied .onion with a phishing address between your copy and your paste.
Simultaneous slowness across all three endpoints has three likely causes in order of probability: a DDoS event targeting the Tor hidden service layer, a Tor network congestion event affecting the onion routing paths, or a scheduled maintenance window. In all three cases, the correct response is to wait — not to look for additional addresses.
Vortex uses a queue-based DDoS mitigation system rather than CAPTCHA challenges. Under heavy load, the platform queues incoming connections and processes them in order. Pages load slowly but completely. This system was specifically designed to keep the platform functional under attack conditions — if you can connect at all, even a slow connection eventually resolves. Typical queue durations during peak attack windows run 30–40 minutes before load normalizes.
If all three mirrors are genuinely unreachable for more than 90 minutes, check the Dread /d/vortex thread for a status update from the market operators. All official communications about downtime, maintenance, or infrastructure changes are published there with PGP signatures. Do not look to Telegram, Twitter, or any clearnet source for platform status — none of those channels are verified and attackers use unplanned outages to push phishing links into the information vacuum.
Only inside Tor Browser, and only if that browser is not syncing bookmarks to any cloud service. Tor Browser's bookmarks are stored locally inside the browser profile directory. As long as that profile is not backed up to or synced with an external service, the bookmark stays on-device.
Never bookmark a .onion address in Chrome, Firefox, Safari, or Edge on your normal profile. Modern browsers sync bookmarks automatically to your Google, Apple, or Mozilla account — which means your .onion URL ends up on someone else's server, timestamped with the date you bookmarked it. Even if the service is encrypted in transit, you have created a record linking your identity (the account) to the address at a specific time.
The safer habit is not bookmarking at all. Copy the address fresh from this page each session. It takes three seconds. The advantage of copying fresh is that you detect a clipboard-hijacking attack immediately — if the first eight characters of the pasted address don't match what you see on the page, something intercepted your clipboard. A bookmark would have taken you to the same address without the comparison step.
v3 .onion addresses are permanent by design. The address is derived from the ed25519 keypair generated when the hidden service is first configured. Changing the address would require generating a new keypair and announcing a new address through authenticated channels — a process that typically involves a PGP-signed announcement on Dread with at least 72 hours of advance notice to allow users to update their records.
Vortex has not rotated its canonical addresses since the market launched in October 2023. The three addresses on this page are the same addresses that were published in the market's original announcement. This is normal and expected — legitimate markets only rotate addresses in response to infrastructure compromise or law enforcement seizure of server hardware, which would be accompanied by a public statement.
Illegitimate actors sometimes claim a market has "rotated" or "updated" its addresses as a pretext to post phishing links. Any claim of an address change should be verified against the PGP-signed announcement on Dread before you use the new addresses. If the announcement is unsigned, treat it as untrusted. If the signature does not verify against the canonical fingerprint, treat the addresses as hostile.
A PGP canary is a short, dated, digitally signed statement published by the market operators. It typically says something like: "As of [date], Vortex Market has not been served with a law enforcement order, the addresses remain unchanged, and the platform is operating normally." It is signed with the market's canonical private key. Vortex publishes a canary at least every 72 hours.
To check the canary: after connecting to any Vortex mirror, find the canary in the platform footer or a dedicated canary page. Copy the full signed block. Run gpg --verify. Check two things: the signature is valid (produced by the canonical key you have already imported), and the date is within the past 72 hours. If both check out, the platform is attesting to normal operations.
A missing canary — or a canary older than 72 hours — is a signal to pause. It does not necessarily mean the platform has been compromised. It might mean the signing process was delayed due to an operational issue. The correct response is to wait a few hours and check again on a different mirror. If the canary is stale across all three mirrors for more than 12 hours, check Dread for operator communications before logging in or initiating any transactions.
A valid canary is a positive signal. Its absence is only a negative signal if it persists. Don't panic over a single stale canary check — but don't ignore it either. One check, three hours later, resolves most ambiguity.
The interface is copied first. Vortex's distinctive deep-purple background, cyan accents, terminal typography, and neon card borders are all replicable in a few hundred lines of CSS. Sophisticated phishing operators produce pixel-accurate clones that pass casual visual inspection. The login form renders. The "forgot password" flow works — long enough to capture credentials. Even the market statistics and vendor listings can be populated with scraped or fabricated data to make the platform feel live.
The attack vector is the address. Since phishing operators cannot generate a v3 .onion address that matches Vortex's canonical key, they rely on users either typing an address with an error, copying from an unverified source that includes a phishing address, or having a clipboard-hijacking extension swap the address between copy and paste. The platform cannot be spoofed — only the path to it can be manipulated.
Specific attack patterns to know:
Typo-squatting: a 56-character address with one character changed. Character substitutions typically happen in positions 10–50 where users rarely check, and use visually similar characters — i→l, 0→o, 2→z in some fonts.
Directory poisoning: posting phishing links in forums, Telegram groups, or "trusted" directories that lack PGP verification. These sources account for the majority of phishing victims.
Clipboard hijacking: a browser extension or malicious process that monitors the clipboard and swaps any .onion address it detects with a phishing address. The copy button press succeeds, but what gets pasted is different. Checking the first and last six characters after pasting catches this.
The defense against all three is identical: verify the PGP signature on any address you use, copy rather than type, and check characters after paste. No shortcuts. No exceptions for "trusted sources."
// related.tools
Tools and references for Tor access and verification
The pages and tools below are relevant to accessing Vortex mirrors safely. All external links open in a new tab.
// download
Tor Browser
Official Tor Browser with verified signature downloads. The only source guaranteeing an untampered binary.
// pgp
GnuPG
The standard PGP tool for verifying Vortex's signed announcements. Available for Linux, Windows, macOS.
// os
Tails OS
Live USB OS that routes all traffic through Tor. Leaves no trace on the host machine after shutdown.
// reading
EFF Self-Defense
Comprehensive digital security guides from the EFF. Covers PGP, Tor, threat modeling, and OPSEC fundamentals.
// encryption
VeraCrypt
Encrypted containers for storing PGP fingerprints, verified addresses, and session notes locally.
// guide
Full access guide
Eight-step Tor setup walkthrough with wallet configuration, PGP generation, and first-order guidance.
Ready? Copy a verified Vortex address.
Three mirrors online. PGP-signed. Check the first six and last six characters after pasting.